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Citizens, Police, and Polarization: Are 
Perceptions More Important Than Facts? 
ROBERT J. CONDLIN 
The latter half of the 1960's has seen an increase in the popularity 
of a fundamental method for the redress of grievances-the riot. 
Feeling oppressed by a society with which they find it impossible to 
identify, militant minority leaders have marshalled the forces of their 
communities and lashed out physically at what they consider the most 
obvious and accessible symbols of that oppression. In the process they 
have posed grave new problems for the police forces of our nation. 
The first problem is that of physical response to the use of force 
by these minorities. The police are meeting this challenge as their 
weaponry and training for the prevention of riots have reached a high 
degree of sophistication.1 The second and more enduring problem 
however, lies in treatment of the underllying evils moving minorities to 
riot. Here the police response has not been as encouraging. Concededly, 
it is not the role of the police, as presently defined, to correct the 
economic and social inequities afflicting various segments of the 
society. Yet a primary cause of the riots of the 60's and an invariable 
catalyst for major incidents has not been social injustice so much as it 
has been minority community hatred of the police created and 
sustained by offensive day-to-day citizen-police confrontations. 
Therefore, if riots are to be preventd, community attitudes must be 
converted from hostility to appreciation of law enforcement and its 
agents. Because many present police practices feed this hostility, the 
greatest capacity for reform lies in the hands of the police . 
. Until now, the institutional police response has been the 
departmental community relations unit. Recent history has shown these 
to be inadequate for both the abatement of hostility and the prevention 
of riots. It is the primary thesis of this aticle that the eradication of 
community hostility requires a new approach free from the traditional 
concepts and definitions of law enforcement. In that spirit, this article 
will first, examine the causes of community hostility and its effects on 
the police; second, examine the police response to this hostility, the 
departmental community relations unit, and suggest some of its 
shortcomings; and finally, suggest a modification of an existing 
B.A. 1966 Siena College, J.D. 1969 Boston College Law School. The Author is Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
I. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1969, at 35, cols. 6,7,8. 
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community relations program believed helpful for the cure of these 
deficiencies. 
The author does not propose to offer a definitive programmatic 
statement for reform, for certainly in the area of contemporary law 
enforcement dogmatism would be fatal. Rather, the purpose here is to 
suggest one alternative approach to the major problem confronting law 
enforcement personnel today. 
The Community's Perspective 
Hostility toward the police is found primarily among minority 
group members, predominantly black,2 who for the most part are also 
very young.3 The reasons for this concentration of hatred in young 
blacks seems to be the following: Ghetto youths, often without work 
and with homes that may be nearly uninhabitable, commonly spend 
much time on the street. Most of the police activity allegedly 
responsible for the present high level of community discontent occurs 
on the street and as a result, is very frequently directed at these youth.~ 
The inability of the police to establish satisfactory channels of 
communication in performing these day-to-day tasks of neighborhood 
patrol has come to be viewed by the young black as representative of 
an underlying bigotry.5 He now is prepared to reciprocate in kind and 
to accept the consequences.6 
2. THE PRESIDENT'S C!)M~IISSION ON LAW ENFORCE~IENT AND AD~IINISTRATIOl' OF 
JUSTICE. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 145-46 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE 
REPORT]. 
3. /d. at 149; REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 303 
(N.Y. Times ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as KERNER REPORT]. The author's experience with the 
Denver Police-Community Relations Committee of the Denver Model Cities Program supports 
this conclusion. The only citizen complaints registered before the committee were brought by 
youths; the most violent expressions of community discontent were voiced by young blacks; and 
the only armed conflict between the police and the citizens of Denver which occurred during the 
summer of 1968 involved black youths almost exclusively. A Chronology of CALM, REPORT OF 
THE POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS COMMITTEE TO THE DENVER MODEL CITIES PROGRA~I 3, 5, 
7 (1968). 
4. KERNER REPORT. supra note 3. 
5. IV FIELD SURVEYS. J. LOHMAN & G. MISNER. THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY: THE 
DYNAMICS OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, vol. I, at 107 (1967) [hereinafter 
cited as SAN DIEGO REPORT]. 
6. Important to an understanding of why the black youth has chosen to fight back at this 
particular period in history is the present climate of the country. The civil rights movement has 
decreased black tolerance of indignities inflicted by the police and has greatly intensified the 
demand for equal law enforcement. And this is not to be unexpected, for as Charles Silberman 
pointed out: "The Negroes' impatience, bitterness and anger ... are likely to increase the closer 
they come to full equality. This is not a quirk of Negro character but a characteristic of all 
disadvantaged groups: The closer they are to their goals the harder it is to understand or justify 
the disparities that remain." C. SILBER~IAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 357 (1964). Though 
Congress has repeatedly pronounced the inherent equality of all citizens and passed Civil Rights 
Acts, Civil Rights Act of 1957, 5 U.S.C. § 295-1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1861; 42 U.S.C. §§ 
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Evidence to which blacks point as representative of police bigotry 
encompasses much of law enforcement technique. For example, blacks 
argue- that the use of field interrogation7 is more widespread in black 
neighborhoods than in those of the white residents of the same city .8 
The abusive use of field interrogation, a less frequent yet serious 
occurrence in black neighborhoods, is even more violently complained 
of as contributing to the black citizen's belief in the existence of 
discriminatory law enforcement. Any value which field interrogatiort 
might have as an instrument of crime prevention is lost when a black 
youth is patted down because he happens to be black.9 
Blacks also feel that the police are physically brutal only when 
dealing with black people.10 While the truth of this allegation is open 
1971e, 1975 et seq., 1995; Civil Rights Act of 1960, 18 U.S.C. §§ 837, 1074, 1509;)0 
U.S.C. §§ 241, 640; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq.; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 
d; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975 a et seq., Civil Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq., the 
black man still feels that many police practices deny his supposed equality under the law. Because 
of this perceived deprivation a substantial number of black citizens have come to look upon Jaw 
enforcement agencies as racist organizations which are less interested in enforcing the law than 
they are in enslaving blacks. James Baldwin has given popular expression to this belief in his book 
NOBODY KNOWS MY NAME where he characterizes the police as an occupying army: "He moves 
through Harlem ... like an occupying soldier in a bitterly hostile country; which is precisely 
what and where he is, and is the reason he walks in twos and threes.'! J. BALDWIN, NOBODY 
KNOWS MY NAME 67 (1962), sent to enforce a white man's law which has in the past and 
continues today to be dedicated to the subjugation of the black. For further extension of the 
occupying army metaphor in the form of analogy of the _police occupation of the ghetto to the 
American military involvement in Viet Nam and some interesting parallels, see Niederhoffer, 
Restraint of the Force: A Recurrent Problem, I CONN. L. REV. 289, 293 (1968). 
7. Field interrogation is defined as the stopping, questioning and sometimes friski!Jg by a 
policeman of a suspect on the street when there are insufficient grounds for the policeman to make 
an arrest. L. TIFFANY, D. MciNTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND 
QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 6 (1967). 
8. V FIELD SURVEYS. THE NATIONAL CENTER ON POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS AT 
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS 332 
(1967) [hereinafter cited as MICHIGAN STATE REPORT]. This fact has prompted one black 
spokesman to characterize stop-and-frisk statutes authorizing such interrogation as a classic 
example of class legislation, stating that it is obvious that the pqlice would not stop a Wall Street 
banker on his way to work but that they might and often do stop Harlem businessmen. ld. at 
18. 
9. The fact that police departments usually do not condone eithey .officially or unofficially 
the harrassing use of field interrogation is often unknown and unimportant to the black youth. 
What is important is that the practice is not stopped: Many black youths feel that the reason 
police continue to harrass them is because the police get a sadistic joy out of doing it. This 
sentiment was repeatedly expressed to the author in his capacity as advisor to the Denver Police-
Community Relations Committee by black citizens of all ages and of widely varying philosophies. 
For a possible police interpretation andfor justification of what black youth may see as 
harrassment, see Falk, The Public's Prejudice Against the Police, A.B.A.J. 754, 755 (1964). 
10. KERNER REPORT, supra note 3, at 302; MICHIGAN STATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 155; 
IV FIELD SURVEY, J. LOHMAN & G. MISNER, THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY: THE DYNAMICS 
OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, voJ. 2, at 99 [hereinafter cited as PHILADELPHIA 
REPORT]. 
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to dispute11 the support in fact for such widespread feeling is largely 
unimportant. The fact that the community reveals a consistent pattern 
of belief is in itself the significant fact; for it is the belief, whether 
justified or not, which adds fuel to community hostility and as such it 
is the belief which must finally be dispelled. 12 For even if police 
brutality were to be completely eliminated from the ghetto tomorrow, 
it would continue to be a problem until blacks believed that it had been 
eliminated. 
Individual police verbal abuse or discourtesy directed at black 
citizens, especially black women, is another source of community 
discontent.1=1 This practice, the one most frequently complained of,u is 
perhaps the most offensive of all because of its decided Jack of 
ambiguity. It, more clearly than any other police practice, evinces a 
lack of respect for the dignity and worth of the black citizen.1;; 
Yet another procedure complained of. one which is finding 
increased acceptance among police departments, is the practice of 
concentrating large forces of men and materials, including riot-control 
squads, in areas of a potential disorder. 16 In practice, such a 
concentration occurs most frequently, if not exclusively, in minority 
neighborhoods. This deployment poignantly reinforces the black man's 
impression of the police as an occupation force and serves to intensify 
existing hatred. 
Yet another complaint is that all laws are enforced differently, 
unequally and discriminatorily in the ghetto neighborhoods.1; Many 
II. W. GELLHOR:-1. WHE:-1 A~IERICA:-:s CO~IPLAJ:-:: GOVER:-:~JE:-:TAL GRIEVA:-:CE 
PROCEDt;RES 174-75 (1966); MICHIGA:-: STATE REPORT. supra note 8. at 161-85. 340-44. At least 
one Colorado gubernatorial commission has documented the existence of police physical brutality 
in Denver. THE COLORADO A:-:TI-DISCRI~II:-:ATIO:-: Cmi\!ISSIO:-:: DISCUSSIO:-:. CONCLUSJO:-:S A:-:D 
RECO\nJE:-:DATIO:-:s RESULTI:-:G FRml HEARI:-:GS o:-: EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE BY DE:-:VER POLICE 
3-4 (1964). 
12. MICHIGA:-: STATE REPORT. supra note 8. at 185-86. 
13. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2. at 180-81. 
14. MICHIGA:-: STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 17. 
15. KER:-:ER REPORT. supra note 3. at 303; TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2. at 180. It 
should be noted again that police departments do not condone such activity but often times fail 
to be sufficiently diligent in preventing it. TASK FoRCE REPORT. supra note 2. at 181: W. 
GELLHOR:-:. supra note II. at 175. The consequence of such police administrative laxity is that 
verbal abuse continues to occur with alarming regularity and reinforces the black man's 
conviction that the police do not respect him as either a man or a citizen. 
16. MJCHIGA:-: STATE REPORT. supra note 8. at 349; SA:-: DIEGO REPORT. supra note 5. at 
80-81. 125-26: TASK FoRCE REPORT. supra note 2. at 190. The Denver Police Department believes 
that the most important lesson to be learned from the Watts' riot is the need to concentrate police 
equipment and personnel in areas of potential trouble. Author"s interview with Chief Leonard 
Johnson of the Denver Police Department Community Relations Division in Denver. Colorado. 
June 26. 1968. The Department has also adopted its own version of the tactical squad: the use of 
a police helicopter to. inter alia. patrol the streets and alleys of the minority neighborhoods in 
Denver. 
17. MICIIIGA:-: STATE REPORT. supra note 8. at 14; PHILADELPHIA REPORT. supra note 10. 
at 135; SAS DII:GO REPORT. supra note 5. at 82-84. 
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blacks feel that the police behave differently in every way when dealing 
with ghetto residents regardless of the offense or reason for the 
contact.1x There is some evidence to support this belief as police not 
only respond more slowly to calls for help from the ghetto19 but also 
allow certain forms of illegal behavior such as gambling, prostitution 
and racketeering to flourish in ghetto areas but not in contiguous white 
neighborhoods.20 When the police do use an obvious double standard 
of law enforcement it is difficult for the black citizen not to draw an 
inference of second class citizenship.21 
To many blacks, the common thread which runs through all of 
these objectionable practices is the perceived inference that people who 
live in ghettos and who are black do not deserve the same respect that 
is accorded the more affluent and white members of our society. There 
is a widespread conviction that police, motivated by racial prejudice, 
intentionally harrass and degrade blacks simply because they consider 
them to be second class citizens. The perceived diligence with which the 
police seemingly pursue this goal has also persuaded large numbers of 
black citizens that the stake in their undeclared war with the police is 
the very existence of the Negro race.22 
A final element of the blacks' belief in their second-class 
citizenship is the inadequacy of the present police complaint 
procedures. The black and the poor, because they have little political 
influence, are almost never able to exert pressure for intradepartmental 
disciplining. Therefore, the black citizen, when he feels that he has been 
wronged by the police, must make his protest through police complaint 
bureaus. There is a great deal of mistrust of these bureaus.23 Mariy 
departments have adopted unfair practices which discourage rather 
than encourage the filing of complaints. Some of these methods are 
retaliation in the form of a suit for filing false charges, harrassment, 
resisting arrest charges, requirement that a complaint be filed under 
18. MICHIGAN STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 320. 
19. G. EDWARDS. THE POLICE ON THE URBAN FRONTIER: A GUIDE TO ComiUNITY 
UNDERSTANDISG 31 (1968). 
20. /d.; INTER!'IATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE. WITH JUSTICE FOR ALL: A 
GUIDE FoR LAW ENFORCE~IENT OFFICERS 30 ( 1963). 
21. The importance of investigating and prosecuting crimes in the ghetto as promptly as 
crimes committed elsewhere should not be minimized. This point was strikingly illustrated in 
Claude Brown's book MASCHILD IN THE PRO~IISED LAND. The turning point in the narrator's 
life came when the police arrested the man who had just robbed and stabbed his mother. The 
arrest relieved him of the necessity to kill the robber, as his code would otherwise have required. 
C. BROWN. MANCHILD IN THE PRO~IISED LAND 402-05 (1965). . 
22. Other incidents such as the attack by off-duty policemen, members of a policemen's 
law enforcement group, on several Black Panthers in a Brooklyn courthouse are less subtle 
examples of the existence of this undeclared war. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1968, at 38, col. 2. 
23. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2, at 194. 
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oath and then false reporting charges, the use of complex complaint 
procedures which are not known or explained to the citizen and a 
myriad of other devices.2~ Should a citizen overcome these initial 
obstacles and file a complaint, there is no assurance that his interest 
will be adequately represented when the complaint is investigated and 
heard.25 Furthermore, he is not likely to learn of the disposition of his 
case26 and in most instances will not have the opportunity to appeal an 
ad verse decision to a non-police agency .27 With these inadequacies, it 
is not surprising that most black residents feel that it does no good to 
complain.28 
A dangerous consequence of the closing of grievance channels, 
howeve,r, is that it intensifies the blacks' feeling of alienation and 
powerlessness. The truly second class citizen is the one who not only 
is abused by others but who also is incapable of fighting back. 
Furthermore, the lack of a workable complaint system reinforces the 
notion that there are no existing structures through which the black 
man can legitimately prosecute his grievances. Such a lack also 
supports the proposition that if wrongs are to be redressed, they must 
be done so in an extra-legal fashion. This, in turn, adds fuel to a 
growing philosophy of violence. 
The Police Perspective 
Most police departments and individual police~n feel that the 
great bulk of the practices complained of by the black community 
nevertheless constitute legitimate and fair methods of law enforcement. 
A. meaningful attempt to resolve the problem of police-community 
conflict must provide an avenue of input for this sentiment or it takes 
the very real chance of becoming another partisan force in an already 
overly polarized situation. 
24. /d. at 195; Note, The Administration of Complaints Against the Police. 77 HARV. L. 
REV. 499, 501-02 (1964). 
25. Niederhoffer, supra note 6, at 291; Note, supra note 24, at 505-06. 
26. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2, at 197, supra note 24, at 505. 
27. There have been many proposals to establish civilian boards to review police activity, 
including one in Denver, COLORADO ANTI-DISCRI~IINATION Co~t~IISSION REPORT. supra note II, 
at 7; Note, supra note 24, at 511; however, only six major boards survived the preliminaries and 
actually began to function: Philadelphia in 1958, Minneapolis in 1960, York, Pa. in 1960, 
Rochester in 1963, Washington; D.C. (as presently constituted) in 1965, and New York City in 
1966. One by one they were eliminated by the police until only the Washington review board 
retains a precarious thread of life. Niederhoffer, supra note 6, at 298; See also TASK FoRCE 
REPORT. supra note 2, at 198. 
28. The fact that one of the top priorities of the Police Community Relations Committee 
of the Denver Model Cities Program was the establishment of a new bureau to investigate 
complaints of police brutality is evidence of the fact that the Denver minority community does 
not trust the existing Denver Police Department complaint investigating agency. 
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An initial overview of the police will show that great numbers of 
them strongly resent the criticism directed at them by the black 
community. They feel that the charges leveled against them are unfair.29 
They deny that they are a racist organization or that their practices 
discriminate against particular groups. Instead, they see themselves as 
a "beleaguered army" fighting apathy and evil~the nation's sole 
barrier against crime.=w They fail to understand criticism directed at 
them for performing this job in the time honored and most effective 
manner they know. As a result of community criticism, however, they 
have become more and more defensive. They have begun to withdraw 
from society into an ever-closing group31 and attempts to prevent this 
withdrawal have met with near uniform rebuff.32 
There is a bright spot in this otherwise bleak picture, however, and 
that is the fact that most police departments' are aware of the 
deleterious effect which community discontent has upon police morale 
and conduct33 and because of this are willing, in most instances, to 
make a good faith effort to adopt programs reasonably calculated to 
reduce this discontent. What the police demand from such programs 
is that they be adaptable to police personnel and structures as they 
actually exist and not as an academic theoretician would like or 
suppose them to. It is in this spirit that this inquiry must proceed. 
OFFENSIVE POLICE PRACTICES-REASONS AND EXPLANATIONS 
There are numerous reasons to explain why police act as they do, 
i.e. continue to use practices which openly antagonize a large segment 
of the community. One some occasions incidents which give rise to 
complaints by citizens represent what the community believes them 
to-racist attitudes on the part of individual policemen. Several of the 
field surveys which have examined our metropolitan police departments 
29. MICHIGAN STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 22. 
30. Casper, Call Crime to a Screeching Halt, TRIAL, Oct.-Nov. 1968, at 14; MICHIGAN 
STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 24, 96. 
31. PHILADELPHIA REPORT. supra note 10, at f93. The dangers inherent in the move .ent 
toward a more self-contained and autonomous police force are great. One effect of withdrawal is 
that police departments tend to set standards of behavior for their own personnel which are 
designed to meet the expectations of the department and not to induce empathy on the part of 
the police for the cultures or value systems of other people. An example of such a self-serving 
standard is the Philadelphia code for officer behavior which, in almost all of its sections, 
proscribes conduct which the police department found offensive to itself but contained only one 
example of an act which would be offensive to the public PHILADELPHIA REPORT. supra note 10, 
at 193. See also Niederhoffer, supra note 6, at 293. 
32. One need only look to the treatment accorded civilian review boards for evidence of 
this rebuff. See note 27, supra. 
33. Wilson, Police Morale, Reform and Citizen Respect: The Chicago Case, in THE POLICE 
137, 156 (D. Bordua ed. 1967). 
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have concluded that most departments employ individuals who are 
either biased or prejudiced against minorities=u and that this bias often 
manifests itself in the form of stricter treatment accorded to members 
of minority groups.=15 
Environmental Prejudices 
Another" possible explanation for police behavior is what can best 
be described as an "environmental prejudice" inherent in the role of 
policeman. To understand this prejudice, one must consider that a 
number of elements in the policeman's environment suggest the 
conclusion that all black men are criminals. This suggestion can be 
found in the training the police recruit receives-in particular, the 
"practical" education supplied by the veteran policemen with whom he 
works.36 In addition to this factor, the increased motorization of 
patrols has resulted in a withdrawal of the policeman from personal 
contact with ghetto residents except for when he is enforcing the law. 
As a result, most of the ghetto residents he comes to. know are real or 
suspected criminals.:1; The effect of these repeated experiences is that the 
policeman soon begins to go into the ghetto expecting most of the 
people he meets to be criminals. As a result, his treatment of all 
individuals whom he encounters is geared accordingly .:1K 
Guidelines and Discretionary Power 
A third factor responsible for offensive police behavior is that 
individual policemen are often inadequately prepared for a job which, 
by its very nature, will frequently place them in unusually difficult and 
complex situations. Much of what the patrolman must do in the course 
of day-to-day maintainance of order calls for an exercise of his 
discretion. He is frequently forced to decide whether his long-range 
goal of preserving order will be best served by enforcing the letter of 
the law in a particular situation.=19 Many of these delicate decisions 
must be made on the spur of the moment, under extreme pressure~0 and 
34. KERNER REPORT. supra note 3, at 305-06; MICHIGAN STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 
341-42; PHILADELPHIA REPORT. supra note 10, at 192-93; SAN DIEGO REPORT. supra note 5, at 
122-23. 
35. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2, at 164. 
36. /d. 
37. KeRNER REPORT. supra note 3, at 305, 315; EDWARDS. supra note 19, at 27. 
38. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 27. 
39. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 4-5; KERNER REPORT. supra note 3, at 312-13; SAN DIEGO 
REPORT. supra note 5, at 43. 
40. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 179; See also W. LAFAVE. ARREST: THE 
DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 510 (1965). For less spontaneous but nonetheless 
very real psychological pressures under which the police must operate see Comment, Police 
Brutality and Civilian Review Boards: A Second Look, 44 J.URBAN L. 625,627-28 (1967). 
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with guidelines which are almost always inadequate and frequently 
non-existent.41 The problem is not that police administrative personnel 
do not want to cofify such guidelines-they do -but to do this they 
need the community's assistance. For the community itself best knows 
what is an acceptable level of noise or how many youths on a street 
corner are too many. Before workable guidelines for the use of 
discretionary power can be written the police must be able to go to the 
community and obtain this information.42 
Resentment of Certain Police Procedures 
A fourth and more important reason for the continuing use of 
hostility provoking field practices is that the police fail to recognize the 
deep resentment which these practices have engendered within the 
community. A number of these procedures were adopted because they 
were easier and less time consuming than their more legally correct 
alternatives. An example of such a practice is the arrest for purposes 
of an investigation. Many p-olice personnel use minor criminal statutes, 
especially the status offenses, to facilitate investigations. A person 
suspected of committing a more serious crime is charged with one of 
these minor offenses and detained for the length of time necessary for 
the officer to conduct a thorough investigation.4=1 Despite its widespread 
use, an arrest for investigation very often has no legal basis44 and is a 
device for which a competent police officer usually has no need.4;; The 
cities of Detroit and Washington, D.C. have successfully abolished 
arrests for investigation46 and there is no reason to believe that other 
cities are not capable of doing the same. There can be no question that 
the failure to abolish them will be costly in the form of deteriorated 
police-community relations. 
The police are also often ignorant of the hostility generated by 
unintended discourteous treatment of ghetto residents.47 What is often 
41. I<ERSER REPORT. supra note 3, at 312-13; LAFAVE. supra note 40, at 512-14. 
42. MICHIGAN STATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 310; See Also Edwards, Order and Civil 
Liberties: A Complex Role for the Police, 64 MICH. L. Rev. 47,58 (1965). 
43. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2, at 187-88. 
44. EDWARDS. supra note 19, at 29; A~IERICAN BAR FOUNDATION: LAW ENFORCE~IENT IN 
THE METROPOLIS 79 (1967). 
45. PUBLIC AD~IINISTRATION SERVICE. THE SAVANNAH POLICE DEPARniENT, Part V: 
Guidelines to Measurement and Evaluation (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1964), at 
21-22. 
46. EDWARDS. supra note 19, at 29. 
47. As one example, the San Diego police were under the mistaken impression that their 
field techniques were not resented when in fact the community deeply objected to them. The police 
relied upon the fact that no complaints were filed as the basis for this belief but the reason for 
the absence of complaints was the community's distrust of the complaint procedure. SAN DIEGO 
REPORT. supra note 5, at 128. This unquestioning faith in complaint statistics as indicative of 
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viewed by the community as police discourtesy is frequently not an 
expression of a racist or biased attitude but instead simply the 
consequence of an individual policeman's failure to appreciate the full 
implications of his actions. For example, calling a black teenager by 
his first name may arouse resentment because many whites still refuse 
to extend to adult Negroes the courtesty of the title "Mister. "~K A 
patrolman may take the arm of a person when leading him to thepolice 
car without realizing that a black man is likely to resent this as an 
implication that he is on the verge of flight, an implication which may 
degrade him in the eyes of onlookers.~9 In neither of these examples 
does the policeman intend a lack of respect for his black suspect and 
yet this is how each would, in many instances, be interpreted. 
Even the criticism of existing police complaint procedures can be 
traced directly to inaction based on an ignorance of the problem. Police 
assume that their complaint procedures effectively ferret out 
community dissatisfaction, and, as a corollary assume that an absence 
of complaints indicates that the community is content.4° We have seen 
earlier that both of these assumptions are frequently incorrecfH yet 
continuing adherence to them by the police effectively proscribes any 
major improvement in citizen grievance mechanisms. 
Necessity of Offensive Procedures 
The final and perhaps the most important reason for the existence 
of offensive police practices is that many departments, while regretting 
their ofensive nature, regard such practices as necessary tools for 
effective crime prevention. The practice of field interrogation, for 
example, has been found to be an efficient method of collecting 
information about persons and events within high crime areas which 
in turn can be used to deter crime within these same areas.';2 The use 
of physical force-correctly believed to be an infrequent 
community discontent or the lack thereof is also present at administrative levels within the Denver 
Police Department. Author's interview with Chief Leonard Johnson of the Denver Police 
Department Community Relations Division in Denver. Colorado. June 26, 1968. 
48. KERNER REPORT. supra note 3, at 303. 
49. !d. at 303-04. 
50. SAN DIEGO REPORT. supra note 5, at 128. 
51. See note 46, supra. 
52. LAW ENFORCE~IENT IN THE METRO.POLIS. supra note 44, at 18-22: MICHIGA:" STATE 
REPORT. supra· note 8, at 328, 333-34. For other justifications for the practices of field 
interrogation see Tiffany, Field Interrogation: Administrative. Judicial and Legislative 
Approaches, 43 DENVER L...J. 389, 392-94 (1966}. However, the fact that most police departments 
do not have a central agency for the dispersal of of information gained through field 
interrogatjons derogates to some extent from the validity of the police justification of performing. 
an information gathering function. MICHIGAN STATE REPORT. supra note 8. at 335. 
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occurrence53-is felt to be a necessary police procedure when dealing 
with suspects who oftentimes exert physical pressure themselves. 
The same is felt of the practice of on street harrassment of youth. 
Because youths commit an increasingly large proportion of crime, 
police are under growing pressure from their supervisors and the 
community to deal with them forcefully. Harrassment, both verbal and 
physical, may therefore be viewed by some departments as proper 
fulfillment of this end.54 The same reasons are used to support the 
police procedure of concentrating forces within potential trouble areas. 
When used, this practice has had, in the short term, one of two effects: 
l) that of containing disorders and thereby minimizing the harmful 
consequences55 or 2) preventing a disorder from occurring at all.56 
Even the minority community's allegation that the laws are 
enforced unequally stems from what is believed to be a valid police 
procedure, that being the apportionment of police personnel based upon 
the population of the area in question.5; The unfortunate consequence 
of this admittedly non-racist basis for police assignment is that high 
crime areas often receive the same amount of protection as areas with 
an equal population but with a crime frequency rate which is 
considerably smaller. As a result, police in high crime areas frequently 
find that they do not have sufficient manpower to enforce all laws and 
therefore must concetrate on those laws most calculated to maintaining 
an acceptable level of public peace and order. The corollary of this 
limited enforcement is that those violations which do not make noise 
or create disturbances, but do offend the sensibilities of large portions 
of the community, e.g. gambiing, prostitution, etc., are often 
overlooked and therfore flourish. 
Perceptions And Facts 
In short, there is no simple or concise explanation of why police 
act as they do. What is clear is that the community's charge that police 
are racists interested primarily in the subjugation, if not the 
annihilation of the black is true for only a very small percentage of 
urban policemen. Yet, because the community perceives policemen as 
bigots that allegation cannot be ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. The 
community's fear must be dealt with and if it is a misunderstanding 
and misinterpretation of the real facts, explained as such. At the same 
53. EDWARDS. supra note 19, at 30; U.S. CO~I~IISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS. JUSTICE 2-8 
(1961). 
54. KER:-IER REPORT. supra note 3, at 303. 
55. WITH JUSTICE FOR ALL. supra note 20, at 13-15, 35-36. 
56. PHILADELPHIA REPORT. supra note 10, at 190-91. 
57. EDWARDS. supra note 19, at 31. 
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time, the police belief that all accusations directed at them by minority 
groups are unfair is likewise more false than true. The majority of 
those citizens livingiin our urban ghatlos ara as much if notimore 
concarned with improving law enforcement than almost any other 
segment of our society .5K This is not surprising when one considers that 
black peopleiara most frequenlly tpeivictimuioficrimu§9 and as a result, 
most often compelled to seek the assistance of the police. Yet, because 
the belief that minority citizens are unfair is the perceived reality of the 
police community it too must be dealt with directly. 
In a situation of this nature, where each antagonist perceives a 
different problem from a single set of facts, perceptions become more 
important than facts. To som~ degree, perceptions even become facts. 
Therefore, before community hostility can be eliminated programs 
must be devised which are capable of dealing with the problem as it is 
perceived by the two conflicting communities. These programs must 
provide an opportunity for widespread police-citizen interaction in 
which each side is given, however, informally, an opportunity to 
explain its perception of the problem to the other. From there, the two 
groups, working together in their mutual self-interest, should be able 
to direct their efforts toward formulating responses acceptable to and 
identified with each faction. This spirit of mutual resolution of police-
citizen conflicts has, to some extent, been evident in the one 
institutional response to the problem, that being the Police Department 
Community Relations Unit. As we shall now see, however, community 
relations units have always been an incomplete and far too often an 
insincere response to what is an all-pervasive police problem and as 
such, have not succeeded. We must now be prepared to look for new 
responses. 
THE INADEQUACY OF CO:vt:vtUNITY-RELATIONS UNITS 
Public Relations and Community Relations 
Police department community relations units were intended to 
"bring together . . . police in the local districts and the residents of 
the communities for a common education and understanding of each 
other's problems and activities. " 811 However, from their inception, 
58. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2, at 148; see also Cummings. Cummings & Edell. 
Policeman as Philosopher, Guide and Friend. 12 Soc. PROBLE~IS 276. 280 (1965). 
59. EDWARDS. supra note 19, at 32-33; TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2. at 148. 
60. PHILADELPHIA REPORT. supra note 10, at 62. 
61. The impetus for the public relations approach came from the initial success of the St. 
Louis CGmmunity Relations Unit. That unit, which made effective and imaginative use ofpublic 
relations techniques, has served as a model for most present day community relations units. The 
success of the St. Louis program can in large measure be attributed to the fact that it was one 
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community relations units have, for the most part, been concerned with 
what is more properly characterized as public relations.61 The 
distinction between community relations and public relations is this: 
public relations is a one-way communication process aimed at selling 
a particular product, in this case the police department. It works best 
if the product is previously unknown and is of less value in garnering 
public support if there is an already entrenched distrust of the product. 
Community relations, on the other hand, involves a two-way 
communication process focusing community resources on problem 
. solving. In the context of our discussion, it requires a recognition of 
the fact that there are two groups, equally interested in and affected 
by Jaw enforcement procedures, which share the burden of resolving 
police-citizen conflicts.62 
Before significant progress can be made in the elimination of 
minority group discontent the police must acknowledge the validity of 
the community relations approach and provide for significant citizen 
influence in the Jaw enforcement process. The existing system of 
community relations units, tied as it is to the old notion of selling the 
citizenry on what the police want to do, appears to be a particularly 
inappropriate vehicle for this task. 
Inadequate Channels of Communication 
Another failing of the present community relations efforts, closely 
related to that just considered, is the inability or unwillingness of the 
police to open channels of communication with all elements of the 
community which they serve. The Michigan State Commission, which 
has conducted the most extensive survey of police community relations 
programs to date, found that all current programs have failed to reach 
the very segments of the community with which the police are in 
conflict. Instead, they have been successful in reaching only those which 
were in rather complete agreement with the police at the beginning.sa 
The seeking out of grass roots representatives, especially the more 
militant kind, is vital to a successful community relations program for 
it is those hostile toward the police who are the source of most 
discontent and consequently the ones who most need to be reached.11~ 
of the very earliest community relations efforts. It reached its peak at a time when citizens with 
whom it dealt were more receptive to police men and/or programs. Conditions have changed, 
however. The police are no longer trusted nor are their motives considered pure. This is not to 
imply that this was the situation in the late 1950's when the St. Louis program was enjoying 
prosperity but it now appears that the delicate balance has swung from grudging cooperation to 
non-cooperation. The community no longer wants nor is going to allow itself to be "sold." 
62. MICHIGAN STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 86-87; TASK FORCE''REPORT. supra note 2, 
at 153; J. SKOLNICK. PROFESSIONAL POLICE IN A FREE SOCIETY 14. 
63. MICHIGAN STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 91. 
64. Part of the reason for the exclusion of militants from community relations programs 
is that militants are often argumentative and make for unpleasant and difficult meetings. Yet it 
is better that this conflict take place in the controlled context of a meeting than in the streets. 
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It also is not sufficient that the police simply be willing to allow 
hostile persons to participate in community relations programs 
whenever they should happen to apply. Because present programs do 
not reach the militant elements of the populace the police must never 
let up in their efforts to induce such people to participte and must seek 
them out rather than wait for them to apply.66 
The San Francisco Community Relations Program 
One example of a good faith effort to involve all elements of the 
society in a "community relations" approach to law enforcement was 
the San Francisco Police Department Community Relations Program 
of 1963-67 .6; In that program, each police district was divided into 
smaller geographical areas called sections and each section was headed 
by a section chairman who was a resident of the community. The 
chairman was assisted by a committee of citizens from his area whom 
he and not the police department selected. 
The section committees met monthly within their geographical 
areas to discuss the problems of th~ir respective neighborhoods. 
District police officers, assigned to the meetings as liaison officers, met 
with them. At these meetings the neighborhood residents drafted 
·proposals which, among other things, suggested ways in which police-
citizen interaction could be improved. The proposals were then 
forwarded to a district committee, consisting of all of the section 
chairmen of a particular district plus a special district chairman, vice-
chairman and secretary. The district committee collected all of the 
section proposals into a single package and forwarded this package to 
an executive committee. The executive committee, consisting of the 
section chairmen, district committee officers, the commanding officer 
of the police district and members of the Police Department 
Community Relations Unit, then decided what action should be taken 
on each of the specific section _proposals. 
Through this structure the San Francisco Police Department had 
the benefit of a considerable amount of resident input, especially at the 
section committee level, which otherwise would not have been available. 
The effects of this input were unusual to say the least. In response to 
the community's expressed need, the community relations unit assigned 
its men to neighborhood youth opportunity centers to help in finding 
jobs for black youth; they helped in raising money for the construction 
65. MICHIGAN STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 120-21. 
66. /d. at 121. 
67. For a complete description of the San Francisco Police Department Community 
Relations Program of 1963-67 see id. at 44-52. 
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of neighborhood recreation centers; assisted in upward bound programs 
trying to place young blacks in college; coached blacks for union 
examinations; and participated in intra-mural basketball leagues within 
the neighborhoods.68 
The response to this unorthodox approach to community relations 
was overwhelmingly favorable. The San Francisco unit was praised in 
a report prepared for the President's Crime Commission, for opening 
"new communication channels with community segments never before 
considered reachable."69 It was commended by San Francisco civil 
groups and praised by blacks themselves for "really doing 
something."io Yet all was not perfect in the San Francisco program 
and the eventual failure of that most innovative of all community 
relations efforts tells something of the fatal inherent structural defects 
to be found in all community relations units. 
The San Francisco unit, like all of its counterparts, made the 
mistake of not providing for widespread grass roots police 
participation.71 As we have seen earlier, the problem of police-citizen 
conflict is not completely the product of the civilian psyche. Individual 
and departmental police practices often provide the stimulus for much 
of the existing hostility. The work of reducing this hostility must 
therefore deal with both the entire stimulus and the entire response if 
it is to be successful in eliminating the problem. 
Another reason to suggest that the job of community relations is 
best done by all policemen rather than by a particular unit is that when 
a small group of individuals is singled out of the greater whole and 
given the specific task of reducing community tension, the remainder 
of the patrolman force does less community relations work than before. 
They believe, with some justification, that community relations is not 
their job, that the community relations unit is the proper agency to 
resolve difficulties which may arise in that field.n This reaction is fatal 
to any meaningful improvement in police-citizen relations. The most 
extensive police-citizen contact remains the on-street confrontation and 
if that continues to be performed in an offensive manner than even the 
most imaginative and extensive community relations program will be 
unable to reduce community tension.i3 
68. Carruth, Our War Was With the Police Department, in THE NEGRO AND THE CITY 123-
24 (1968). 
69. KERXER REPORT. supra note 3, at 318; Interview with Herbert T. Jenkins, TRIAL. Oct.-
Nov. 1968, at 18. 
70. Carruth, supra note 68, at 122. 
71. /d. at 125-27. 
72. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2, at 151. 
73. MICHIGAN STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 358-59. 
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The simple fact of the matter was that the San Francisco program. 
like all other departmental community relations programs, never 
involved more than a handful of men at any one time and contrary to 
theoryH the activities of those men were not well known nor of 
significant influence in the rest of the department.75 This fact was not 
lost upon members of the minority community, either, as they came 
to know the community relations unit as not representative of police 
department attitudes or policies as a whole. Blacks now recognize such 
units as small and distinct divisions which often do not have the 
administrative support of their own department76 and are frequently 
ridiculed by the remainder of the patrol force.77 The failure of the police 
to accord significance or influence to the work of community relations 
units has caused many residents to believe that the police are not 
seriously interested in bettering relations with all elements of the 
community. They see the present community relations programs as a 
"snow-job" or "con-game" whose only real purpose is to serve as 
"showpieces" to improve the image of the police within the white 
society.78 This belief in turn reinforces the notion that the police do not 
respect the black community and do not deem its problems worthy of 
serious effort. 
The foregoing comments are not intended as depreciation of either 
the institution or the work of departmental community relations units. 
At the time the idea of community relations became popular there was 
clear evidence that, absent some central agency to plan overall policy 
and coordinate activity, the job would not be done.79 However, 
community relations programs have progressed beyond those early 
conditions and the thinking in the field must similarly progress. Police 
departments must not tie themselves unnecessarily to ideas which may 
have been appropriate for another time but which have now outlived 
their usefulness. It has become clear that the work of improving 
community relations is most effectively done when it is done by all 
members of a police department. For this reason, efforts must now be 
directed toward implementing programs designed to make all 
policemen participants in this venture. 
THE POLICE-CITIZEN NEIGHBORHOOD CmtMITTEE 
New programs designed to deal with the problem of police-citizen 
conflict need not reject, in toto, past efforts, such as that of San 
74. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2, at 153-54. 
75. /d. at 151. 
76. /d.; Carruth. supra note 68, at 126. 
77. Carruth, supra note 68. at 125. 
78. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2, at 153. 
79. /d. at 150-51. 
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Francisco. In fact, with slight modification providing for more 
widespread police involvement, the section and district committee 
structure of the San Francisco program could become a 'Yorking model 
for a genuine "community" relations approach to reducing community 
tension. 
Section Committees and Flexibility 
Instead of meeting with a liaison officer from the police 
department, members of the section committees, the "grass roots" 
neighborhood participants, could meet on a regular basis with all of 
the patrolmen who work in their particular section of the city .80 They 
could form a joint police-citizen committee which could have the same 
jurisdictional base as that of its predecessor, namely all matters 
relating to the maintenance of order11 within the section. 
The committee could become a quasi-governmental neighborhood 
unit for the purpose of maintaining order. It could provide a forum for 
all those who live and work within the neighborhood and act as their 
spokesman in dealing with higher governmental echelons. It could draft 
and forward all neighborhood82 proposals and resolutions in the same 
fashion as the San Francisco section committees. It could also draft 
guidelines for and otherwise assist in the exercise of discretionary power 
by patrolmen working within the committee's area of the city. But 
most important, it could and would encourage a return to the concept 
of a community law enforcement allowing· both citizens and police to 
join forces in what is properly their common cause.l'1 
In providing for a joint police-citizen committee program there are 
certain obstacles which must be studiously avoided. The size of the 
section committee should be flexible and yet small enough to allow the 
groups to be representative and workable units.84 This means that in 
dividing police districts into sections, care must be taken to make them 
as small as conditions, geographical, ethnic, etc., allow. In general, it 
is better that many small groups contribute tha:n that a single large 
80. Police participation could be insured by making attendance part of the patrolman's 
duty assignment. 
81. The maintainance of order should be distinguished from Law enforcement, the second 
aspect of the twofold duty of the police. For a discussion of the differences between these two, 
see Wilson, What Makes a Better Policeman. 223 ATL. MoNTHLY, Mar., 1969, at 131. 
82. "Neighborhood" as it is used in this context refers to the new group, comprised of both 
civilians and police. represented by the joint section committee. 
83. MICHIGAN STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 95. "In a democratic society, the corollary 
is the dependence of professional police upon the public with regard to detection, evidence, 
financial support and in the last analysis, the police job itself." Hall, Police and Law in a 
Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 143 (1953). 
84. MICHIGAN STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 116-17. 
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committee have charge of preparing the complete program. Small 
groups are more likely to enlist a meaningful cross-section of grass 
roots support than a single large group which often becomes 
representative of only the philosophy of the dominant personality of the 
group.85 Police departments also must not be hesitant to form 
committees from street corner gangs, tavern habituees, exconvicts, 
militant organizations and the like.86 The concept of sectioning must 
remain flexible and should be defined as any unit of citizens which can 
be singled out as having similar problems and interests. 
Discussion of Sensitive Topics 
The second major caveat which poiice departments must be careful 
to obey is to not be defensive and instruct their men to refuse to discuss 
certain areas of police work. If two-way communication is going to be 
established the police must encourage the discussion of sensitive topics. 
When citizens ask questions about controversial subjects they expect 
frank and honest replys. Police hostility to sensitive questions will be 
viewed as lack of interest and respect.8; People will then stop asking 
what is really on their mind and meaningful communication will cease 
to exist.88 
Finally, since a large part of what the police must do in a 
community relations program is convince the citizens of police sincerity 
in seeking to reduce the existing community tension, a department must 
be prepared to reevaluate and change existing policies and practices in 
light of the information supplied by the joint committees. If there is a 
clear consensus of committee opposition to a particular practice then 
a department must be willing to abolish that practice. Likewise, if there 
is a clear consensus that the department should be doing more in 
community affairs, then the department must be willing to increase 
such participation. The -important thing is that the members of the 
committees, both police and civilian, be made to believe that their 
recommendations do influence police policy decisions. Until this is 
done the committees' work, to many of the participants, will seem to 
be little more than an exercise in futility. 
A police-dtizen committee, thus composed, would deal with the 
problems of community discontent as it is perceived, as well as with 
85. This was a problem encountered by the Denver Police-Community Relations 
Committee. During crisis situations that group often became representative of no more than the 
few strong personalities who belonged to it. To its credit. it sought community ratification. of the 
decisions it made but often these decisions were presented as a fait accompli. 
86. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2, at 157. 
87. MICHIGA:-.1 STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 71-72. 
88. !d. 
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the problem as it really exists. Citizens would be able to protest the 
offensive nature of many of the law enforcement practices which are 
presently employed. Police would learn, for the first. time in many 
instances of the pent up hatred for the policeman based on the 
discriminatory way in which it is believed that he enforces the law. 
At the same time, community residents would be given an 
opportunity to put their perceptions into new perspective. They· would 
learn from their fellow police committee mer,ibers that the motivation 
for most offensive police conduct cannot be completely explained !n 
terms of the ever popular "racist attitudes" phrase. 
The participating policemen would have an opportunity to express 
their belief that unfair and apathetic persons are at the root of much 
of the community criticism, that the criticism is not valid and that once 
this is recognized, police-citizen conflict will end. They too will be given 
an opportunity to put their allegations into new perspective. Increased 
contact with citizens sincerely interested in effective law enforcement 
would help them to understand that much community comment is 
offered constructively in an attempt to help the policeman better 
perform his job. Policemen would come to realize that the black 
community has an interest in effective and fair law enforcement which 
is equal to if not greater than that of any other segment of the society 
and that it is willing to do its part in making such enforcement a 
reality. 
An additional advantage of the police-citizen committee program 
is that it would increase the number of non-adversary police-citizen 
contacts which presently occur. A more extensive and on-going non-
adversarial interaction is a positive good, in itself, for it can serve to 
break down the barriers of ignorance, fear and environmental prejudice 
that presently exist.89 While it may not be practical to demand that 
policemen establish residency within the area in which they work90 
committee meetings of this kind can help to further the purpose served 
by that suggestion, that is making the policeman a part of the 
community in which he works.91 
Committee meetings can also serve as a means of providing 
policemen with an empathy for the cul.ture and values of the citizens 
with whom they work. Present police training programs designed to do 
this are often inadequate because in most instances those instructing 
(other policemen) are not sufficiently familiar with the community to 
89. Bordua, Comments on Police-Community Relations, I CONN. L. Rev. 306, 320 (1968). 
90. This was the suggestion of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 166. 
91. /d. 
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impart the necessary knowledge.92 A final reason for supporting the 
committee program is that it fulfills the primary objective of any 
attempt to resolve the problems in police-community relations, that of 
bringing about a genuine two-way communication between citizens 
andpolice9:1 from which both are able to discover that neither desires 
to fight the impending war. The alternative to a group of this nature 
is to take the discussion into the street where the lighting is bad and 
the surroundings not conducive to flashes of insight and understanding. 
CONCLUSION 
Devising and implementing new programs designed to reduce the 
level of community discontent will not be easy and yet it appears that 
the burden to do so falls directly upon the police.94 They have the prime 
responsibility for safeguarding life and property and to do so they must 
obtain the support of the community.9;; Such support will not be 
forthcoming as long as a substantial segment of the populace looks 
upon them only as an occupying force. 96 The police can refuse to 
initiate new programs and prepare themselves for the increased violence 
and the lessening of respect which is sure to come.9; Or they can admit 
fallibility and seek out the support and aid of the community to try 
new approaches. The community is prepared to help, as most blacks 
critical of the work of the police are quick to recognize the necessity 
of having a police force and desire improved relations with it.9x What 
the black citizen now seeks is an opportunity to participate directly in 
a process which vitally affects his day-to-day life. The community 
wants action, not promises. If present trends continue however, it will 
not be long before it will accept neither. The burden is squarely upon 
the police departments of our nation and the time to assume that 
burden is now. 
92. MICHIGA:-; STATE REPORT. supra note 8. at 321-22: SA:-; DIEGO REPORT. supra note 5. 
at 131. 
93. TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 2. at 1.56. 
94. KER:-;ER REPORT. supra note 3. at 300. 
95. /d. 
96. !d. at 30 I. 
97. MICHIGA:-; STATE REPORT. supra note 8, at 256. 
98. See note 58 supra. 
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